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Notes
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES TO CONTRACTS IN
NEW JERSEY
The rights of third parties to contracts is a moot
question in many jurisdictions; especially so as to third
party beneficiaries in Pennsylvania. It would perhaps be
interesting to see how the problem has been handled in
New Jersey, where the rules have been clarified to a considerable extent, both by statute and decision.
There are two classes of interested third partiesthird party beneficiaries and assignees, and they will be
treated in that order. Since the scope of the problem is
very broad, and an intricate discussion would accomplish
the purpose to no greater extent, only the basic questions
will be considered.
Third party beneficiaries are of three classes-donee,
creditor, and incidental. The right of the first two classes
to sue is established by statute.
"Any person for whose benefit a contract is made,
whether such contract be under seal or not, may maintain an action thereon in any court and may use the
same as a matter of defense in any action brought
against him notwithstanding the consideration of such
contract did not move from him."1
This statute is merely declaratory of the old rules, and
the only vital change was in making these rules the same
as to sealed as they were to unsealed contracts.2 The
reasoning back of the rule embodied in the statute is sound.
Since the intention of the parties to the contract was to
make the third party a real party in interest, such third
party should be given the power and means to enforce and
protect the interest intended for him. That the courts are
quick to aid the third party. may be found in the cases of
13CS 4059, 28.
2Holt v.Life Insurance Co., 76 N. J. 1. 585.
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Whitehall-Tatum Co. v. Vineland 3 and Skillman v. Fidelity and
Guaranty Trust Co.4

As a matter of practice the statute has been held to be
permissive only and not obligatory. 5 Thus the third party
may sue in his own name or as use plaintiff, by the common law method.
That the benefits of this statute do not extend to incidental beneficiaries has been repeatedly held.' The mere
fact that such person would be advantaged by the full
performance of the contract is insufficient,' and New
Jersey follows what may be called a universal rule in this
regard. Since the incidental beneficiary cannot sue upon
the contract, neither can he maintain an action of tort for
a breach of the contractual duty. To maintain such an
action "the plaintiff must have the same status under the
contract as would entitle him to maintain an action upon
contract for breach of its stipulations".8
It is well to note here that the right of a beneficiary
to sue will be recognized though such party was not, or
could not, be identified at the time the contract was made.
As long as the party can "afterwards establish his claim to
be the beneficiary of the promise of the right to recover
upon it", he will be allowed the statutory right. 9
Choses in action arising out of both contract and tort
can be assigned. The questions involved in the former
class are controlled in the main by the Practice Act of 1913.
"****all choses in action arising on contract shall be
assignable at law and the assignee may sue thereon in
his own name, but in such action there shall be allowed
all set-offs, discounts and defenses not only against
the plaintiff but against the assignor before notice of
such assignment shall be given to the defendant; the
8102 N. J. L. 28.
4101 N. J.L. 511.
'Holt v. Life Insurance Co., 76 N. J. L. 585.
'Styles v. Long Co., 67 N. J.L."413; aff. 70 N. J.L. 301; Knapp v.
Lumber Co., 99 N. J.E. 381; Reilly v.Feldman, 103 N. J.L.517.
TStyles v. Long Co., 67 N. J.L. 413.
'Styles v.Long Co., 67 N. J.L. 413.
OWhitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. I. L. 75.
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assignment of a sealed instrument by writing not
under seal shall be as valid as if under seal."'u
Where there is any reference to "non-assignability" of
such choses in action, it will be found that the parties to
the contract have made the obligations personal, and in
such case there can be no valid assignment without the consent of both original parties."
The statute is not compulsory as to the method of assignment, and it is only permissive as to the manner of
bringing an action. Thus, it has been held that parole assignments are valid, 2 and that the assignee may sue in his
5
own name or in the name of the assignor.1
An assignment is not impaired as to the parties thereto by failure to give notice of the assignment to the
debtor. 14 The assignee gets an immediate right to demand
payment from the obligor although stich obligor had no
notice of the assignment at the time the demand was
made. 5 The case of Kafes v. McPherson 6 goes a step further, and holds that a failure of notice does not give a judgment creditor of- the assignor a right prior to the assignee.
From the words of the statute it will be seen that the debtor has all defenses against the assignee that he had against
the assignor until the time notice of the assignment is
given. Thus, despite the assignment, the debtor may discharge his liability by payment to his original creditor, if
the debtor has not been given notice of the assignment.
In this regard, the statute is merely declaratory of the
previous rules. 7
103CS 4056, 19.
"Hanlin v. Keller, 95 N. J. E. 466, 123 Atl. 299; aff. 96' N. J. E.

672, 126 Atl. 925.
12Jemison v. Tidall, 89 N. J. L. 429.
"IElsberg v. Houeck, 76 N. J. L. 181 (citing Sullivan v. Visconti,

68 N. J. L. 543).

14Kafes v. McPherson, 32 Atl. 710; Cogan v. Conover Co., 69 N.
J. E. 809, 64 Atl. 973.
15Board of Education v. Duparquet, 50 N. J. E. 534.
1632 Atl. 710.
1T Miller v. Stockton, 64 N. J. L. 614, 46 AtM 619.
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Partial assignments are not recognized at law,18 but
are enforced in the courts of equity.19 An able discussion
of the rules and reasons is found in the case of Otis v.
20
Adams.
"In courts of equity, where all interested may be included in one action and their respective rights and
equities settled by one decree, rights growing out of a
partial assignment of a chose in action, contract, etc.,
may be recognized and enforced without injury to the
other contracting party. But when such partial assignments of liabilities give rise to separate actions at law,
it is obviously unjust to recognize and protect rights
so acquired without the consent of the contracting
party who would be subjected to such additional
actions."
If the debtor has been given notice of the partial assignment, he may be held accountable in equity for any
subsequent payments he may make to the assignor in disregard of the rights of the assignee. 21 Under a provision
in the Practice Act of 1912,22 the diffi6ulties arising out of
this matter of partial assignment may be overcome by the
assignor and assignee joining as plaintiffs and bringing the
action at law.
It was the rule at common law that choses in action
arising out of tort were not assignable if the right of action
were one which abated with the death of the person
sustaining the injury. This rule was recognized in the case
of Weller v. Jersey City Street R. R. Co.,23 in holding that a
chose in action arising out of personal injuries could not be
assigned before the same was reduced to judgment.
"The rule is nearly universal that tortious acts of a
party causing damages to another create a right of
action which abates with the death of the person
sustaining the injury, and therefore cannot be trans18Steinberg v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 78 N. J. L. 277.
19Todd v. Meding, 56 N. J. E. 83.
2o56 N. J.L. 38.
21
Todd v. Meding, 56 N. J. E. 83.
22
Rule 9; 1 Cum. Supp. CS 1212, 142.
2868 N. J. E.659, 61 Atl. 459.
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ferred so as to confer upon the assignee authority to
maintain a suit for the wrong inflicted."
Thus, citing the above case, it was held that no right
of action was assignable that did not directly involve a
right of property. 2' It would seem from a consideration of
these cases, therefore, that only choses in action arising out
of torts to property are assignable, and that the rule is
contra as to those arising out of torts to the person.
The question as to whether an assignee of a chose in
action on tort may bring an action in his own name is
answered by statute.
"The assignee for valuable consideration of any
chose in action, if the assignor be dead, may sue for
and recover the same in his own name; and the defendant in any such action may set up any defense
thereto arising before he shall have received notice of
such assignment in the same manner and with like
effect as if the assignor had been living and the action
had been brought in his name." 25
This statute is a re-enactment of the act of 1890.
Under this prior statute, it was held that the provisions
as to the manner of bringing the action were obligatory.
Thus, the assignee may sue in his own name only when
the assignor is dead, and prior to his death the suit must be
26
brought in the assignor's name.
E. F. Hann, Jr.

INHERITANCE TAXES-RIEPORTS
BY BANKS

OF DEATH

The Act of June 22, 1931, P.L. 690 is substantially a reenactment of the Act of June 20, 1919, P.L. 521 as last
amended by the Acts of March 28, 1929, P.L. 118 and May
16, 1929, P.L. 1795. The title of the act has been changed
by inserting therein "defining and taxing transfers made
24

Baker v. Dieterich, 118 AtI. 745.
263CS 4057; Practice Act 1903.
20Gaskill v. Barbour, 62 N. J. L. 530, 41 Ad.700.

